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Misfire: How the North Carolina Pistol Purchase Permit System
Misses the Mark of Constitutional Muster and Effectiveness *
The North Carolina pistol-purchase permit system, originating in the Jim Crow
Era, remains an obstruction for North Carolinians seeking to exercise their
Second Amendment rights. The permit system requires that an individual
possess a permit to purchase a handgun. Permits can only be obtained by applying
to one’s local county sheriff’s office, assuming the applicant satisfies a myriad of
conditions and pays the five-dollar per-permit fee.
Such a system directly implicates the core of the Second Amendment by posing a
direct burden on the ability of one to acquire a handgun for possession in the
home. Under the modern two-part test for the Second Amendment, the
permitting system falls short of satisfying strict scrutiny, as well as intermediate
scrutiny. In addition, the permitting system faces difficulties in the face of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
As a whole, the system is largely redundant with federal law, adding cost, time,
and frustration for handgun purchasers. Furthermore, the permitting system is
ripe for abuse by allowing denials for subjective “good cause.” This subjective
criteria for denial is suspect since Black applicants are rejected at a rate near
three times as high as White applicants. Finally, when compared to states
without the permitting requirement, North Carolina’s crime rates are within a
few percentage points of theirs, indicating that the permitting system is not
sensible policy.
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INTRODUCTION
While facially racist laws have mostly faded into the past, in North
Carolina, gun-control laws from the Jim Crow era 1 stay on the books—more
than one-hundred years after their inception. 2 The North Carolina pistolpurchase permit system (“North Carolina permit system” or “permit system”)
is an antiquated gun-control law that requires the grant of a pistol-purchase
permit for a citizen to purchase a handgun. 3 It is one of a host of similar state
pistol-permit schemes, most of which have been repealed. 4
The North Carolina permit system is unconstitutional under the Second
and Fourteenth Amendments and is not sensible policy. The legislature should
repeal the permit system and opt to follow existing federal gun control which
achieves nearly identical results.
Part I of this Comment explores the origins and operations of the system,
as well as the racialized history of gun control and its lingering presence today
1. See A Brief History of Civil Rights in the United States: Jim Crow Era, GEO. L. LIBR.,
https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=4172697 [https://perma.cc/T57F-NMLB] (July
29, 2020, 7:23 AM) [hereinafter A Brief History] . The Jim Crow era was a period of time in the earlyto-late 1800s and early 1900s where southern Democrats enacted discriminatory legislation in an
attempt to suppress minority populations—Black Americans in particular. Id. Much of the legislation
focused on inhibiting Black Americans from voting, as well as from interacting with the White
population. Id.
2. See infra Sections I.B.
3. See infra Sections I.A.
4. See infra notes 111–18 and accompanying text.
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in the form of the permit system. Part II delves into the cornerstone Second
Amendment cases, District of Columbia v. Heller 5 and McDonald v. City of
Chicago. 6 Part III discusses lower court rulings post-Heller/McDonald and
details the prominent two-part test modernly used for Second Amendment
challenges. This part also explores the lesser used Kavanaugh Test. Part IV
applies the two-part test to the North Carolina permit system, concluding that
strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of review for assessing the
constitutionality of the permit system. 7 This part also evaluates the permit
system under the Kavanaugh test and the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, this
part compares the North Carolina permit system with existing federal guncontrol laws and explores the overall efficacy of pistol-purchase permitting
schemes. This Comment concludes with a recommendation that the North
Carolina legislature repeal the permit system to instead rely on existing federal
gun control.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
An analysis of the North Carolina permit system provides insight into
both the motivations of post-Civil War state legislatures as well as the current
state of Second Amendment jurisprudence. First, this Comment will discuss
the origins and operations of the permit system and its underlying motivations.
Second, it addresses the principal Second Amendment cases of Heller and
McDonald. Lastly, this part will explore how lower courts have treated the
Second Amendment since Heller and McDonald and discuss the modern tests
employed.
A.

Origins and Operation of the Law

The North Carolina permit system dates back to 1905, when the state
legislature considered the idea of having local governments enact restrictions
on the sale of arms. 8 The North Carolina permit system, which was mandated
statewide, came to life in 1919 with the requirement that, before transfer of a
pistol, one must acquire a license or permit from the clerk of superior court. 9
5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
6. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
7. This Comment assumes Heller is the law but acknowledges that many lower courts have
resisted and even ignored the holding. See infra Part III. See generally Brittany Occhipinti, We the Militia
of the United States of America: A Reanalysis of the Second Amendment, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 431
(2017) (arguing that Heller should be read to support a militia-oriented interpretation of the Second
Amendment).
8. An Act to Amend the Charter of the Town of Pine Bluff, in Moore County, Priv. L. No.
1905-35, ch. 188, § 6, 1905 N.C. Sess. Laws 545, 547 (1905).
9. An Act to Regulate the Sale of Concealed Weapons in North Carolina, ch. 197, § 1, 1919 N.C.
Sess. Laws 397, 397 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-402 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws
2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)).
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Originally, each permit cost fifty cents. 10 The law required that the clerk of
superior court find that the permit applicant possessed good moral character
and desired to acquire the pistol for protection of their home. 11
Presently, the sale of weapons in North Carolina is regulated under Article
52A of the General Statutes of North Carolina. 12 The permit system prohibits
any person from selling, giving away, transferring, purchasing, or receiving, any
pistol at any place within the state “unless: (i) a license or permit is first
obtained under this Article by the purchaser or receiver from the sheriff of the
county in which the purchaser or receiver resides; or (ii) a valid North Carolina
concealed handgun permit is held.” 13 Permits received from the sheriff’s office
are valid for five years and allow for one pistol per permit. 14
To obtain a permit, an individual must submit an application electronically
to the sheriff’s office in the applicant’s county of residence and satisfy three
requirements. 15 First, the applicant must pass a criminal background check in
which the sheriff checks with the State Bureau of Investigation and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation by conducting a check through the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) and “a criminal history check
through the Administrative Office of the Courts.” 16 Second, the applicant must
“fully satisf[y]” the sheriff of their good moral character via affidavits, oral
evidence, or otherwise. 17 Finally, the applicant must “fully satisf[y]” the sheriff
that their desire to possess a handgun is for “(i) the protection of the home,
business, person, family or property, (ii) target shooting, (iii) collecting, or (iv)
hunting.” 18 Each permit application must include five dollars for each permit
requested, a copy of government-issued identification, proof of residency, and
a signed release form that authorizes and requires disclosure to the sheriff of
any court orders concerning the mental health or capacity of the applicant. 19 In
Wake County, this disclosure can only be effective if signed while physically
present in the sheriff’s office. Compounding the difficulty of this requirement,
applications are not considered “submitted” until the release form is signed.
After an application is submitted, the sheriff’s office has fourteen days to
respond with a denial or approval of the permit. 20 The statute further lists

10. Id. § 3, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws at 398.
11. Id.
12. N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 14-402 to 14-409 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
13. Id. § 14-402(a) (LEXIS).
14. Id. § 14-403 (LEXIS).
15. Id. § 14-404(a) (LEXIS).
16. Id. § 14-404(a)(1) (LEXIS).
17. Id. § 14-404(a)(2) (LEXIS).
18. Id. § 14-404(a)(3) (LEXIS).
19. Id. § 14-404(e1)(2)–(5) (LEXIS).
20. Id. § 14-404(f) (LEXIS).
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conditions for automatic denials of permits, 21 which mirror the criteria of
federally prohibited firearm possessors. 22 Furthermore, the statute allows the
sheriff to decline permit issue “for good cause shown” if the requirements are
not “fully satisfied.” 23 Overall, “good moral character” and “desire . . . [for]
possession” are the only additional requirements posed by the North Carolina
permit system when compared to federal law. 24 If the sheriff issues a denial, the
sheriff must provide a written refusal containing the specific facts upon which
the sheriff concluded that the applicant was not qualified. 25 Post-denial, the
only available avenue for relief is an appeal to the superior court, where the
court will evaluate the reasonableness of the sheriff’s refusal. 26
In summary, any time an individual seeks to lawfully gain possession of a
pistol—including purchasing, gifting, or transferring—one must apply to the
sheriff’s office; pay five dollars; and satisfy all the statutory requirements, many
of which are subjective in nature. These requirements, however, did not arise
from concern for public safety but rather were motivated by a desire to inhibit
minorities from arming themselves.
B.

Underlying Racial Motivations of Gun Control and Permitting Schemes

Despite claims to the contrary, 27 the racial (and racist) history of the
United States has directly influenced the development of modern gun-control
laws. 28 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court itself in its infamous Scott v. Sanford 29
decision denied citizenship to Black people, in part, because granting citizenship
would “give to persons of the negro race . . . full liberty . . . to keep and carry
arms wherever they went.” 30 In similar fashion, North Carolina began its

21. See id. § 14-404(c) (LEXIS).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d).
23. N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-404(b) (LEXIS).
24. Compare id. § 14-404(a), (c) (LEXIS) (stating that a sheriff must be fully satisfied of an
applicant’s good moral character before issuing a permit), with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (containing no moral
character requirement for possession of a firearm).
25. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-404(b) (LEXIS).
26. Id. (LEXIS).
27. See, e.g., Ladd Everitt, Debunking the ‘Gun Control Is Racist’ Smear, WAGING NONVIOLENCE
(Sept. 16, 2010), https://wagingnonviolence.org/2010/09/debunking-the-gun-control-is-racist-smear/
[https://perma.cc/URW6-499F] (arguing that gun control was enacted not to discriminate against
minorities but instead to provide for the public’s safety).
28. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of The Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right To
Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1524–25 (2010) (documenting the United States’ lengthy history
of withholding gun ownership rights from “non-American ‘others,’ including noncitizens, especially
when citizenship is racially defined”).
29. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
30. Id. at 404.
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journey to disarm Black residents in an act of 1840, 31 under which free men of
color were restricted from carrying firearms and from which White men were
exempt. 32 Following a constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina upheld the act, finding no constitutional issue since (1) “free people of
color cannot be considered as citizens” and (2) it is necessary to “preserve the
peace and safety of the community from being disturbed by an indiscriminate
use [of firearms] . . . by free men of color.” 33
After the Civil War, “Blacks were routinely disarmed by Southern
States.” 34 Many southern states enacted Black Codes, which contained
provisions prohibiting freed slaves from possessing or carrying firearms. 35
These codes were found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment after its
ratification in 1868 because the Constitution required that gun control laws be
racially neutral. 36 States circumvented this requirement by enacting various
discriminatory cost-based prohibitions, such as permitting schemes or by only
allowing for the purchase of expensive handguns. 37 Some states banned
handguns altogether, yet allowed exceptions for sheriffs and their “special
deputies”—a euphemism for White men. 38 And “[a]s Jim Crow intensified,
other Southern states enacted gun registration and handgun permit laws.” 39
However, racially charged gun-control permitting schemes were not
limited to the South. In 1911, in response to a brazen murder-suicide, 40 New

31. An Act to Prevent Free Persons of Colour from Carrying Fire-Arms, 1840–1841 N.C. Sess.
Laws ch. 30, 61 (codified at N.C. REV. CODE ch. 107, § 66 (1855)), repealed by N.C. CONST. of 1868,
art. IV, § 24; State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250, 252 (1844).
32. See id.
33. Newsom, 27 N.C. at 254–55.
34. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614 (2008).
35. See David B. Kopel, The Klan’s Favorite Law, REASON (Feb. 15, 2005),
https://reason.com/2005/02/15/the-klans-favorite-law/ [https://perma.cc/U78U-TRWX] [hereinafter
Kopel, Klan’s Favorite Law]. See generally JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REP.
OF THE J. COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, at 229 (1st Sess. 1866) (noting that freedmen’s weapons
were being seized routinely in South Carolina); PARIS ANTI-SLAVERY CONF., SPECIAL REPORT OF
THE PARIS ANTI-SLAVERY CONFERENCE, at 82 (1867) (stating that freedmen “were forbidden to own
or bear fire-arms, and thus were rendered defenseless against assault”).
36. David Kopel & Joseph Greenlee, The Racist Origin of Gun Control Laws, HILL (Aug. 22,
2017, 11:00 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/civil-rights/347324-the-racist-origin-of-guncontrol-laws [https://perma.cc/6TSF-YT7F].
37. Id.; Kopel, Klan’s Favorite Law, supra note 35.
38. AM. C.R. UNION, THE TRUTH ABOUT GUN CONTROL, RACISM AND GENOCIDE 15 (1st
ed. 2015) (noting “special deputies” was nothing but a euphemism for “company goons” and the Ku
Klux Klan).
39. Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 36 (noting that permit schemes were passed in Missouri in 1919
and in Arkansas in 1923).
40. Michael A. Walsh, Opinion, The Strange Birth of NY’s Gun Laws, N.Y. POST (Jan. 16, 2012,
5:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2012/01/16/the-strange-birth-of-nys-gun-laws/ [https://perma.cc/
5BXR-KX6S].

99 N.C. L REV. 529 (2021)

2021]

MISFIRE: NORTH CAROLINA MISSES THE MARK

535

York passed the Sullivan Act, 41 which required a license to possess a concealed
firearm. 42 Overall, enforcement of the Act was largely discriminatory, 43 and
many questioned the sponsoring senator’s motives given his extensive
involvement in the New York crime world. 44
Similar to North Carolina’s permit system, Florida enacted a licensing
scheme in 1893 45 that required a license to carry or possess a pistol or rifle (“the
Florida permit system”). 46 The Florida permit system subsequently became the
focus of litigation. 47 Concurring in the dismissal of an alleged violation of the
Florida permit system, Florida Supreme Court Justice Buford claimed the
Florida permit system was unconstitutional, especially when considering its
historical context. 48 Justice Buford noted that the main purpose of the Florida
permit system was to “disarm[] the negro laborers . . . [and that t]he statute was
never intended to be applied to the white population and in practice has never
been so applied.” 49
Although many of these laws appear racially neutral on their face, often
“selective enforcement made them racist in practice.” 50 And while not the focus
of this Comment, many propose that federal gun control enacted in the 1960s
was also rooted in racism—indicating that not even federal gun control has
escaped its racist roots. 51 Overall, despite the North Carolina permit system
appearing racially neutral on its face, when taken in context with the actions of
surrounding states and the attitudes regarding minorities at the time of

41. Act of July 20, 1965, 1965 N.Y. Laws 2343 (codified as amended in scattered codes of the
N.Y. CONSOLIDATED LAWS).
42. Id. § 400.00, 1967 N.Y. Laws at 2472–77.
43. See AM. C.R. UNION, supra note 38, at 16; see also The Rossi Pistol Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
29, 1911), https://www.nytimes.com/1911/09/29/archives/the-rossi-pistol-case.html [https://perma.cc/
8LMZ-K889 (dark archive)] (documenting how the judge presiding over the first conviction under the
Sullivan Act made note of how “it was the custom of [Rossi, an Italian immigrant] and his hot-headed
countrymen to have weapons concealed upon their persons”).
44. Peter Duffy, 100 Years Ago, the Shot That Spurred New York’s Gun-Control Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 23, 2011, 11:00 AM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/100-years-ago-the-shotthat-spurred-new-yorks-gun-control-law/ [https://perma.cc/XPF8-4KW3 (dark archive)].
45. An Act to Regulate the Carrying of Firearms, ch. 4147, 1893 Fla. Laws 71 (1893) (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06 (Westlaw through Ch. 184 (End) of the 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of
the 26th Leg.)).
46. Id.
47. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 701 (Fla. 1941).
48. Id. at 703 (Buford, J., concurring).
49. Id.
50. AM. C.R. UNION, supra note 38, at 15.
51. See Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/
[https://perma.cc/92BF-C2GC (dark archive)]. For example, the push to ban “Saturday-night specials”
(selling cheaper guns often made of a lower quality metal alloy) was similarly rooted in racism with the
aim of keeping poor Blacks from acquiring handguns. See T. Markus Funk, Gun Control and Economic
Discrimination: The Melting-Point Case-in-Point, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 764, 794–95 (1995).
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enactment, the permit system’s intention was to keep minorities from
possessing handguns. 52
That finding is unremarkable considering that even into the mid-to-late
1900s, gun control was routinely enacted to suppress minorities. 53 Professor
Pratheepan Gulasekaram argues that gun control was a continued mark of
“second-class or inferior citizenship” based upon discriminatory beliefs of
perceived “danger to . . . citizen population[s] from immigrants.” 54 In fact, even
the National Rifle Association supported gun-control legislation—in stark
contrast to its position today—to disarm the Black Panthers in the 1960s. 55
Compounding the impact of this treatment is the fact that Black
Americans are disproportionately affected by gun violence. 56 As a result of
discriminatory gun-control schemes, those most in need of adequate selfdefense means are, and historically have been, those most inhibited from
acquiring them.
II. HELLER AND MCDONALD
The Second Amendment, ratified in 1791, secures the right of the “people
to keep and bear arms.” 57 Key to any Second Amendment evaluation are the
principles outlined in both District of Columbia v. Heller 58 and McDonald v. City
of Chicago. 59 This section provides a thorough summary and review of both cases
in order to set the background for evaluating the North Carolina permit system.
At issue in Heller was a District of Columbia code which generally
prohibited the possession of handguns. 60 The Supreme Court, in striking down
the code, held that the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right
to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 61 Justice Scalia, writing
52. North Carolina’s racist history is not limited to guns. During the Jim Crow era, major Ku
Klux Klan riots occurred in Wilmington, Fayetteville, Winston Salem, and New Bern. Peter Bean,
Fellow Examines Life in North Carolina Under Jim Crow, WILSON CTR. (June 3, 2004),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/fellow-examines-life-north-carolina-under-jim-crow
[https://perma.cc/5TYU-ZRZ2]. In addition, North Carolina was firmly in the hands of Democrats
who kept schools segregated until 1954. See id.
53. See Gulasekaram, supra note 28, at 1561.
54. Id.
55. Thad Morgan, The NRA Supported Gun Control When the Black Panthers Had the Weapons,
HISTORY (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/black-panthers-gun-control-nra-supportmulford-act [https://perma.cc/DN4C-3Z6Y].
56. Nick Cotter, Black Communities Are Disproportionately Hurt by Gun Violence. We Can’t Ignore
Them, PUB. SOURCE, https://projects.publicsource.org/pittsburgh-gun-violence-1/ [https://perma.cc/
756M-WHYK].
57. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
58. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
59. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
60. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75.
61. Id. at 592. Part of this analysis included a breakdown of both the prefatory and operative
clause of the Second Amendment. Id. at 577–78. The Court determined that the right to keep and bear
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for the majority, rejected the constitutionality of a total ban on the possession
of handguns on the grounds that the ban amounted to “a prohibition of an entire
class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for . . . lawful
purpose[s].” 62 In addition, the Court took issue with the handgun prohibition
extending to the home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and property
is most acute.” 63 While never directly stating a level of scrutiny to apply to
future Second Amendment cases, the Court weighed indirectly on the issue:
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core
protection has been subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing”
approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of
government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting
upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of
its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights
are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the
people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even
future judges think that scope too broad. 64
The Court went on to note that the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home “surely elevates above all
other interests.” 65 Finally, the Court noted that the opinion should not cast
doubt on “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” 66 “Taken as a whole, . . . [Heller
holds:] first, that individuals have a constitutional right to protect themselves
with usable firearms, and that this right is at its strongest in the home; [and]
second, that some burdens upon individual Second Amendment rights are
presumptively lawful.” 67

arms—the operative clause—was not limited by the prefatory clause, but rather, the prefatory clause
explained the function of the right. Id. at 577. While some argue that the Second Amendment only
applies to the “militia,” elsewhere in the Constitution the use of “‘the people’ . . . unambiguously refers
to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” Id. at 580. Furthermore, the
“‘militia’ in colonial America consisted of a subset of ‘the people’—those who were male, able bodied,
and within a certain age range.” Id. As Heller makes patently clear, treating the right as only protecting
arms in an organized militia “fits poorly with the operative clause’s description of the holder of that
right as ‘the people.’” Id. at 580–81.
62. Id. at 628.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 634–35.
65. Id. at 635.
66. Id. at 626–27.
67. Lindsay Colvin, History, Heller, and High-Capacity Magazines: What Is the Proper Standard of
Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1052 (2014).
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Only a few years later, in McDonald, the Supreme Court made clear that
the Second Amendment applies to states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 68
The Court specifically rejected the view that the Second Amendment “should
be singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment.” 69 In
addition, the Court also touched on the possible impact on states: as with any
incorporated provision of the Bill of Rights, “[t]he enshrinement of
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table [for
states].” 70 Overall, McDonald serves to reinforce the principles of Heller, but
similarly falls short in establishing firm guidelines for lower courts to follow.
What remains clear after both cases is that full-blown prohibitions, or laws with
the effect of prohibition, are not constitutional.
Some courts understand Heller and McDonald to imply that Second
Amendment cases should be evaluated using strict scrutiny, 71 while other courts
use heightened scrutiny (falling somewhere between intermediate and strict). 72
Unfortunately, given the lack of clarity in both decisions, the Court has left
lower courts mostly to their own devices in determining the proper standard of
review. 73 While not overwhelmingly helpful, “[t]he Heller majority and
McDonald plurality suggested that a historical inquiry could help determine the
scope of the Second Amendment right.” 74 However, the implementation of this
historical test varies dramatically by court. While many courts refuse altogether
to state what level of scrutiny they are using, of those that do, the most common
scrutiny level is intermediate. 75

68. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
69. Id. at 745–46.
70. Id. at 790.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2009) (“[W]here
fundamental rights are at stake, strict scrutiny is to be applied.”). Under strict scrutiny, a law must be
“narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82
(1997).
72. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706 (7th Cir. 2011) (“This necessarily means
that the City bears the burden of justifying its action under some heightened standard of judicial
review.”).
73. Colvin, supra note 67, at 1083.
74. Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD.
L. REV. 1131, 1140 (2011).
75. See SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44618, POST-HELLER SECOND
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 45–46 (2019); Kiehl, supra note 74, at 1145. Under intermediate
scrutiny, the law must serve an important governmental objective and the means employed must be
“substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982)).
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III. POST-HELLER/MCDONALD
Generally, courts have adopted a two-part test to evaluate Second
Amendment challenges post-Heller/McDonald. 76 First, “courts ask whether the
challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.” 77
Second, courts ask whether, under some type of means-end scrutiny, the law is
constitutional. 78 In evaluating the first prong, courts employ an “original
meaning criteria,” focusing on the text and history of the right. 79 Part of this
prong is an analysis regarding whether the challenged law is presumptively
lawful. 80 Courts have struggled with how to interpret the “presumptively
lawful” dicta from Heller over the years, leading to a variety of methods. 81
Relevant to some courts’ analysis is whether laws are still in place; a law
which is later repealed cannot be said to be long standing. 82 Furthermore, other
courts have gone as far as to put the burden of proof on the government to show
that the restriction was in effect “around 1791 and 1868,” when the Second
Amendment was enacted and then made binding on the states. 83 Additionally,
“[t]he only laws that the lower courts have held to be long-standing were
initially enacted in the nineteenth century.” 84 Finally, even if a law is found to
be long standing and presumptively lawful, a plaintiff may rebut this argument
by showing the regulation has more than a “de minimis effect upon his right.” 85
Courts struggle further under the second prong, unable to determine
which level of scrutiny to apply given the lack of guidance in Heller. 86 For many
courts, the distinction between strict and intermediate scrutiny turns on
whether or not the challenged regulation inhibits the possession of arms within

76. PECK, supra note 75, at 12. Hereinafter this test will be referred to as the “two-part test.” The
two-part test arose due to the lack of guidance post-Heller/McDonald. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 13.
79. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Greeno,
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–02 (7th Cir. 2011).
80. PECK, supra note 75, at 14.
81. Id. at 13–15. For example, some courts look to the history discussed in Heller and attempt to
draw parallels to the challenged regulation. Id. at 13. Other courts find the language in Heller relatively
useless and focus more on why the Supreme Court designated certain restrictions as presumptively
lawful. See id. at 15. Courts have struggled to determine whether presumptively lawful regulations are
lawful because they withstand analysis under strict scrutiny (or any level of scrutiny) or because such
regulations fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment entirely. Id. Finally, other courts reject
the presumptively lawful portion of the test altogether, finding it too similar to the rational basis test.
Id. at 14–15.
82. David B. Kopel, Background Checks for Firearms Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, 53
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 335 (2016) [hereinafter Kopel, Background Checks].
83. Id. at 334 (quoting Silvester v. Harris, 41 F. Supp. 3d 927, 963 (E.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d on
other grounds, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016)).
84. Id. at 335.
85. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
86. PECK, supra note 75, at 16.
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the home. 87 For others, the distinction between strict and intermediate scrutiny
is determined by “consider[ing] the nature of the conduct being regulated and
the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.” 88 The Seventh
Circuit employs yet another distinct approach, requiring that the government
make a “rigorous showing” to justify the regulation when the firearm restriction
implicates core Second Amendment rights, such as the ability to possess a
handgun in the home. 89 Under this standard of review, the court evaluates “the
strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the
exercise of Second Amendment rights.” 90 This rigorous showing may be
“something close to strict scrutiny,” if not strict scrutiny. 91
Courts utilizing the intermediate scrutiny test seem to be doing exactly
the kind of interest balancing that Heller prohibited. 92 For example, the Fourth
Circuit justified its refusal to extend Second Amendment rights due to the
court’s fears of being “minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of
mayhem because in the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to
Second Amendment rights.” 93 Unfortunately, this disregard for precedent in
favor of more “likable” outcomes is not limited to the Fourth Circuit.
Constitutional professor and scholar Allen Rostron contends that Justice
Breyer’s balancing test has become the law of the land as lower courts routinely
and regularly disregard Heller, which specifically rejected such a balancing
test. 94 Professor Robert Cottrol contends that appellate courts are simply
applying, at best, a weakened intermediate scrutiny and possibly even a rationalbasis-plus standard. 95 In addition, the legitimacy of the two-part test as a whole

87. See Kiehl, supra note 74, at 1145–46.
88. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 179 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010)); see, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir.
2013). This distinction is largely pulled from First Amendment law, which is unsurprising given
Heller’s comparisons between the rights. See PECK, supra note 75, at 16.
89. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
90. Id. at 703.
91. PECK, supra note 75, at 13.
92. Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1867 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). While some might argue that Heller itself performed interest balancing in holding that
certain long-standing regulations were acceptable, the rationale for that holding is found in the lengthy
historical practice of the regulations, not their interests to society. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n
v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1540–41 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (discussing
how history supported certain laws restricting the right to access firearms).
93. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
94. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 757 (2012); see also Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1867 (“With what other
constitutional right would this Court allow such blatant defiance of its precedent?”).
95. Robert J. Cottrol, Second Amendment, Constitutional Dysfunction or Necessary Safeguard?, 94
B.U. L. REV. 837, 841 (2014).
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has been called into question by multiple sitting Supreme Court Justices. 96
Dissenting from a denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas pointed out how lower
courts are “minimiz[ing] . . . [Heller and McDonald’s] framework” by employing
an “entirely made up” test that does not comport with any long-standing notion
of constitutional law. 97 Furthermore, Justice Thomas noted that “[t]he Second
Amendment provides no hierarchy of ‘core’ and peripheral rights,” nor do any
precedents support the application of the binary test. 98
While he was a judge for the D.C. Circuit, Justice Kavanaugh took issue
with a similar, incorrect application of Heller’s principles. 99 In Heller v. District
of Columbia (“Heller II”), 100 the majority used intermediate scrutiny to uphold a
law requiring the registration of handguns as well as a prohibition on certain
semi-automatic rifles. 101 Justice Kavanaugh, in dissent, opined that the proper
test to apply is a “text, history, and tradition” standard. 102 In other words, “[t]he
scope of the right is thus determined by ‘historical justifications’ . . . [a]nd
tradition.” 103 Given Justice Kavanaugh’s recent appointment to the United
States Supreme Court, there is a real possibility that this standard of review
will be used in future Second Amendment challenges. Therefore, this Comment
will apply both the common two-part test and the Kavanaugh test to North
Carolina’s permitting scheme.
IV. NORTH CAROLINA SHOULD REPEAL ITS PISTOL-PURCHASE PERMIT
SYSTEM AS IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE SECOND AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND IS NOT A SENSIBLE POLICY
The North Carolina permit system does not pass constitutional muster
under the Second Amendment, failing both the two-part test as well as the
Kavanaugh test. This holds true under both intermediate and strict scrutiny.
Furthermore, the permit system is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment as it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
Finally, the permit system should be repealed because it is largely ineffective.

96. Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1867 (2020); see also Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1527 (per curiam)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“I share Justice Alito’s concern that some federal and state courts may not
be properly applying Heller and McDonald.”).
97. Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1866–67.
98. Id. at 1867.
99. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
100. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (majority opinion).
101. Id. at 1257, 1262, 1264.
102. Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (rejecting an interest balancing approach where judges
can “re-calibrate the scope of the Second Amendment”).
103. Id. at 1272.
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The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Is Unconstitutional Under
the Second Amendment as It Fails the Common Two-Part Test
1. The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Fails Prong One

The first prong of the test asks whether the law implicates the Second
Amendment and whether it is presumptively lawful. 104 The pistol permitting
scheme implicates the Second Amendment as it creates a waiting period
through its approval process and medical release form signing period. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has found that a ten-day waiting period alone
implicates the Second Amendment. 105 Surely the combination of a permitting
scheme that effectively creates a waiting period while waiting to sign medical
release forms and while approval is pending also implicates the Second
Amendment. In practice, the date from which one decides to purchase a
handgun and the date of final approval of the permits could be months apart. 106
In addition, the permitting system directly affects one’s ability to acquire a
handgun. As “[o]ne cannot exercise the right to keep and bear arms without
actually possessing a firearm,” 107 access to arms is a necessary precondition to
exercising the right. Limiting access to a traditionally popular and accessible
firearm directly implicates the Second Amendment. 108
In applying the two-part test to determine whether the challenged
regulation implicates the Second Amendment, courts will also ask if the
regulation is presumptively lawful as a long-standing regulation. 109 To answer
this, courts look to history and tradition, specifically as they relate to permitting
systems. 110 Traditionally, systems requiring that a person receive permission
from the government before buying or borrowing a firearm have been rare in
the United States. 111 Leading up to the Civil War, several states enacted
legislation prohibiting Black persons from possessing firearms without a

104. PECK, supra note 75, at 45.
105. See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 827 (9th Cir. 2016).
106. See, e.g., infra notes 188–91 and accompanying text (describing delays of up to five weeks in
Wake County).
107. Silvester v. Harris, 41 F. Supp. 3d, 927, 962 (E.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 843 F.3d
816 (9th Cir. 2016).
108. See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Making Second Amendment Law with First Amendment Rules: The
Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 93 NEB.
L. REV. 429, 460 (2014) (explaining that “Heller suggests that the Second Amendment protects
weapons that are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”).
109. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
110. See id. (upholding a registration requirement as presumptively lawful given the history).
While I find the holding in this case to be an erroneous application of the standards described in Heller,
it nevertheless acts as an example of how courts have typically justified a law as presumptively lawful
by looking to history and tradition.
111. Kopel, Background Checks, supra note 82, at 304.
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license. 112 In North Carolina, all free persons of color had to acquire an annual
license in order to own or carry firearms. 113
Following the Civil War and in the early twentieth century, isolated
racially neutral permitting schemes came into effect to prevent freedmen from
acquiring means to defend themselves—the North Carolina permit system
among them. 114 Similarly, Missouri enacted a permitting system in 1921 for the
sale of handguns, but it has since been repealed. 115 Overall handgun purchase
permits were required by the following states: “New York (1911), Oregon (1913,
repealed 1925), North Carolina (1919), Missouri (1921, repealed 2007),
Connecticut (1923), Michigan (1927, partially repealed by several steps in early
twenty-first century), Hawaii (1927), New Jersey (1927), and Texas (1931, later
declared void).” 116 Thus, only a total of six states currently have permit systems
in place as holdovers from the Jim Crow era. 117 The majority of state gun laws
of the early 1900s were less restrictive than the permitting systems put in place
in the minority of states listed above. 118
There is little possibility that the North Carolina permit system is
presumptively lawful as a long-standing regulation. The regulation came about
in the twentieth century, and was not a common one at that. 119 “Permission laws
were the exception, not the norm, in the early twentieth century.” 120 Both the
timing of the regulation, and the fact that it was, and remains, uncommon are
factors that cut against finding the permit system a traditional long-standing
regulation. Furthermore, of the few states which have enacted such permitting
schemes, over half have been repealed or partially repealed. 121 This further
reduces the possibility that the permits are a long-standing regulation. 122 While
the antiquated North Carolina permit system is still on the books, there is little
support left for such permitting requirements. In addition, given the racial
connotations of the permitting schemes discussed above in Section I.B, it is
unlikely that any modern court would seek to uphold a system rooted in Jim
Crow era discriminatory practices. Finally, the North Carolina permit system
was enacted in 1919—well within the time frame that courts have found to be

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 337.
Id. at 338.
See id. at 342–46.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 360–61.
Id. at 361.
See id. at 362.
See supra notes 114–17.
Kopel, Background Checks, supra note 82, at 340.
Id. at 360–61.
Id. at 335.
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too late to be established as long-standing. 123 Overall, the North Carolina
permitting system satisfies the first prong of the common two-part test.
2. The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Fails Prong Two
Next, under the second prong, the court must determine whether the
pistol permit scheme is unconstitutional under some means-end scrutiny. 124
First, the court must determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. 125
Generally, “[l]aws that neither implicate the core protections of the Second
Amendment nor substantially burden their exercise do not receive heightened
scrutiny.” 126 Rather, “[h]eightened scrutiny is triggered only by those
restrictions that . . . operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding
citizens to possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or for other lawful
purposes).” 127 The scope of the legislative restriction as well as the availability
of alternative solutions factor into the analysis of determining the burden the
challenged law places on the right. 128 However, strict scrutiny may not apply if
the burden does not constrain the Second Amendment’s core area of
protection. 129 As evidenced by Heller, rational basis is inapplicable. 130
Therefore, at a minimum, the court will employ intermediate scrutiny.
However, Heller and McDonald strongly suggest that applying intermediate
scrutiny to laws that categorically limit the Second Amendment is
inappropriate. 131 Despite this, federal circuits routinely employ intermediate
scrutiny to Second Amendment cases. 132
To resolve these issues, courts should evaluate the North Carolina permit
system under strict scrutiny. Heller and McDonald suggest that no interestbalancing approach should be used. 133 An inhibition on the ability to acquire a
123. See Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that regulation on
large capacity magazines was not considered long-standing given that the regulation emerged in 1927
and had almost been entirely repealed); Mance v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795, 805 (N.D. Tex. 2015)
(finding a statute enacted in 1909 too recent to be considered long-standing); Silvester v. Harris, 41 F.
Supp. 3d, 927, 963 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (finding a statute enacted in 1923 to be too late to be considered
long-standing), rev’d on other grounds, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016).
124. PECK, supra note 75, at 13.
125. See id. at 15.
126. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 258 (2d Cir. 2015).
127. United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
128. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 259.
129. Id. at 260. “If a law regulating arms adversely affects a law-abiding citizen’s right of defense
of hearth and home, that law strikes at the core Second Amendment right.” Duncan v. Becerra, 970
F.3d 1133, 1152 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 963
(9th Cir. 2014) (finding that a challenged law “[o]n its face . . . implicates the core because it applies
to law-abiding citizens and imposes restrictions on the use of handguns within the home”).
130. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
131. Adam P. Soloperto, A Standard of Review for Gun Rights: The Second Amendment Question Hot
as a Two-Dollar Pistol, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 225, 231 (2016).
132. PECK, supra note 75, at 45–46.
133. See supra Part II.
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handgun for the defense of oneself in the home, which the North Carolina
permit system does, hits at the very core of the Second Amendment. For
example, under the Seventh Circuit’s standards, rigorous scrutiny, which some
equate to strict scrutiny, would be employed since the permit system directly
affects one’s ability to purchase a handgun for use in the home. 134 One must go
through the burdensome process of applying to the sheriff’s office, pay a fee for
every permit, go to the sheriff’s office to sign health release records, wait for
approval, and return to the sheriff’s office to pick up the permits to simply
acquire a handgun. Therefore, without going through the time-consuming
process, one is left defenseless in their home. 135 Furthermore, even when
following the burdensome procedures to legally acquire a handgun, the
significant delay caused by the archaic system means that an applicant is also
left defenseless during the entire timeline of the application. “A burden on the
core of [a] right undermines the very purpose for its codification.” 136 The North
Carolina permit system is a burden to the core of the Second Amendment. It
poses a direct inhibition on the ability of North Carolinians to (1) acquire
handguns, (2) exercise their fundamental right to self-defense, and (3) own and
possess firearms inside their house. 137 As the system was likely enacted to
deprive Black Americans of their core civil rights, the result of the analysis is
unsurprising. 138 In addition, similar to the prohibition in Heller, the North
Carolina permit system’s impact is not limited to the public arena. Instead, the
effects “extend[], moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self,
family, and property is most acute.” 139
Those in favor of intermediate scrutiny might argue that because long
guns 140 are available without a permit, the core of the Second Amendment is
not burdened since citizens still possess the ability to bear arms for defense in
their homes. However, Heller indicated that the presence of alternatives will
not excuse an infringement. 141 Furthermore, the government may not “treat the
right recognized in Heller as a second-class right, subject to an entirely different
134. See supra Part III.
135. See supra Section I.A.
136. Klukowski, supra note 108, at 467.
137. See Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that a ban on large
capacity magazines implicated the core of the Second Amendment protections because it restricted the
ability to both buy and possess large capacity magazines in the home as well as limited the right of selfdefense).
138. See supra Section I.B. For more information on statutes enacted to discriminate against Black
Americans, see generally A Brief History, supra note 1.
139. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
140. Without delving into the intricate and often confusing definitions of various firearms under
federal law, for purposes of this Comment, “long guns” refers to rifles and shotguns. In other words,
guns readily available for purchase outside of the scope of the North Carolina permit system.
141. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban
the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.”).
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body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” 142 We also know that
laws burdening fundamental rights are generally subject to strict scrutiny. 143 In
addition, it is imperative that courts not define the Second Amendment so
narrowly as to give inadequate effect to the right. 144 Any attempt to evaluate
the permit system under intermediate scrutiny would be an attempt to subject
the Second Amendment to second-class treatment compared to other rights.
That second-class treatment came to fruition in Kwong v. Bloomberg, 145
where the Second Circuit upheld a pistol licensing scheme in New York. 146 The
licensing scheme, which prohibited ownership of handguns without a license
and associated fee payment, was upheld by analogy to First Amendment fee
jurisprudence. 147 However, in upholding the licensing scheme, the Second
Circuit failed to acknowledge the crucial difference between possessing a
handgun in the home and conducting a parade or a rally: handgun possession is
conducted in the privacy of the home while parades and similar forms of
expression are conducted in public spaces that often require police presence,
public sanitation, and road closures. 148 The Second Circuit failed to recognize
this distinction and even failed to reconcile the plethora of First Amendment
activities that do not require a fee or license. 149 The court’s comparison of a
handgun purchase for the home, which has no relation to carrying arms in public
or to parades and rallies is severely flawed. A more apt comparison to First
Amendment activity would be an analogy to owning a book in the home or
placing a sign on one’s property. 150 Instead, the court’s logic suggests that almost
142. McDonald v. City of Chicago., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion).
143. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
144. See Klukowski, supra note 108, at 466.
145. 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013).
146. Id. at 172.
147. Id. at 165 (“The Supreme Court's ‘fee jurisprudence’ has historically addressed the
constitutionality of fees charged by governmental entities on expressive activities protected by the First
Amendment—such as fees charged to hold a rally or parade. Two district court decisions that have
considered the issue in the wake of Heller and McDonald have used the same analytical framework to
consider similar claims involving the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”).
148. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) ("The obvious advantage of
requiring application for a permit was noted as giving the public authorities notice in advance so as to
afford opportunity for proper policing. And the court further observed that, in fixing time and place,
the license served ‘to prevent confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to secure convenient
use of the streets by other travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder.'").
149. There are many examples of First Amendment activities that do not require a fee or license.
See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
However, the Kwong court failed to acknowledge any of these examples.
150. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) ("Residential signs are an unusually
cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited
mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
565 (1969) (recognizing that the First Amendment strongly protects the right of one to "read or observe
what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own
home").
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any fee in the Second Amendment context is constitutional because there are
constitutional fees for some First Amendment activities. 151 Furthermore, the
Second Circuit also failed to address wait times associated with the licensing
system and instead chose to focus on the associated fee to determine that no
substantial burden was imposed on the Second Amendment right. 152
Overall, the application of Kwong today is relatively limited. 153 The
decision primarily relied on First Amendment fee jurisprudence in the context
of an undue burden analysis incorporated from abortion jurisprudence. 154 This
undue burden analysis has been rarely used and fallen out of favor among the
circuits for the more-developed two-part test described in this Comment. 155
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the court even used intermediate scrutiny. 156
At best, Kwong illustrates a flawed equivalence of protected activities under two
different fundamental rights.
The undrawn distinction between public activity and private ownership in
Kwong is implicated by the North Carolina permit system—the permit system
is not related to regulating the carrying of arms in the public but instead
regulates access to ownership generally and, by extension, in the home.
Therefore, a lesser level of scrutiny is inappropriate. 157
Support for this line of reasoning can be found in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 158 where the Supreme Court struck down a paid licensing scheme
for solicitors. 159 In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that the
“provocative, abusive, and ill-mannered” nature of the literature being

151. See Kwong, 723 F.3d at 167–68 (“Indeed, the fact that the licensing regime makes the exercise
of one's Second Amendment rights more expensive does not necessarily mean that it ‘substantially
burdens’ that right.”).
152. Id. at 165–66.
153. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 259 n.92 (2d Cir. 2015)
(declining to apply Kwong and instead applying heightened scrutiny to an assault weapons ban).
154. Some question the applicability of fee jurisprudence generally in the Second Amendment
context. See, e.g., Genesa Cefali, Is First Amendment Fee Jurisprudence the Right Approach to the Second
Amendment?, DUKE U. CTR. FOR FIREARMS L. SECOND THOUGHTS BLOG (July 15, 2019),
https://sites.law.duke.edu/secondthoughts/2019/07/15/is-first-amendment-fee-jurisprudence-theright-approach-to-the-second-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/WNG8-G744] (suggesting that First
Amendment fee jurisprudence may not be the proper approach to firearm license fees today given the
Second Amendment’s own relevant history).
155. See supra Part III.
156. Cottrol, supra note 95, at 839–40 (criticizing the Kwong decision, among others, as an example
of “[c]ourts . . . applying, at most, a somewhat weak intermediate scrutiny, perhaps even a rational basis
plus standard” to firearm restrictions).
157. See Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court To Do Post-McDonald,
21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 511 (2012) (discussing how some courts have drawn the line
between intermediate and strict scrutiny as whether the regulation addresses arms in the home or the
public).
158. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
159. Id. at 117.
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distributed justified the license and associated fee. 160 It noted that the
government may not suppress or tax the “dissemination of views because they
are unpopular, annoying or distasteful.” 161 Similar to the content-based
restrictions or justifications described above, these types of “arms-based,”
discriminatory gun-control schemes seek to restrict and suppress politically
disfavored weapons. The North Carolina permit system is an arms-based
restriction since it only applies to handguns and therefore strict scrutiny should
be used.
While federal circuit courts would seem to overwhelmingly disagree with
the conclusion that strict scrutiny should be used, that is not necessarily
surprising. There is an apparent double standard present when comparing the
treatment of the Second Amendment to other constitutional rights. 162 Lower
courts are defiantly resisting the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and
McDonald, and “[c]ontinued refusal to hear Second Amendment cases [by the
Supreme Court] only enables this kind of defiance.” 163 The Supreme Court has
“not clarified the standard for assessing Second Amendment claims for almost
10 [years].” 164 The right to keep and bear arms is effectively the Supreme
Court’s “constitutional orphan . . . [a]nd the lower courts seem to have gotten
the message.” 165 Recently some lower courts have begun to fall more in line with
Justice Thomas’s views, as seen in Duncan v. Becerra, 166 where a panel for the
Ninth Circuit utilized strict scrutiny in striking down a large capacity magazine
ban. 167
Under strict scrutiny, the law must be “narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.” 168 In addition, the law must be no more
restrictive than necessary to achieve the purported governmental interest. 169
For “almost every gun-control regulation . . . [the government’s] primary
concern . . . [is] the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens.” 170 In addition,
the government has an interest in preventing crime. 171 In order to assess
whether the pistol permit scheme would fail under strict scrutiny, it is useful to
160. Id. at 115–16.
161. Id. at 116.
162. Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 950–51 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 951.
165. Id. at 952.
166. 970 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2020).
167. Id. at 1152.
168. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997) (upholding the district court’s redistricting
plan for Georgia’s congressional delegation).
169. Sobel, supra note 157, at 495.
170. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
171. See id.
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see what courts have struck down in other areas of constitutional rights law.
“[T]he Ninth Circuit struck down a county’s 5-day waiting period for nudedancing licenses because it ‘unreasonably prevent[ed] a dancer from exercising
first amendment rights while an application [was] pending.’” 172 The Supreme
Court has held that the First Amendment forbids a county from charging even
a small permitting fee to offset the costs of providing security for a whitenationalist rally. 173 Overall, it seems that the Court provides much greater
protection to other, more “favorable” rights than the Second Amendment. 174
Holding the Second Amendment to the same level of favor, the North Carolina
pistol permit scheme falls short of constitutionality under the Second
Amendment as it imposes a waiting period and fee to exercise the right.
While the government has compelling interests, 175 the permitting system
is not narrowly tailored—or even effective—to achieve those interests since the
permitting system is overwhelmingly redundant with existing federal
regulations. 176 In fact, the sheriff’s office utilizes the same exact NICS
background check as would be performed without the permitting system in
place. 177 Some critics would argue that removing the permitting system would
inhibit checking mental health records. However, in 2016, the Department of
Health and Human Services modified the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) 178 Privacy Rule to expressly permit the
disclosure of the identities of individuals to NICS who, for mental health
reasons, are prohibited from having a firearm. 179 Therefore, the North Carolina
permit system is redundant.
172. Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(quoting Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1060 (1986)).
173. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 136 (1992).
174. Silvester, 138 S. Ct. at 951.
175. Public safety and crime prevention, among other interests, would easily be touted by the
government in defending the permitting system.
176. See infra Section IV.D.
177. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-404(a)(1) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (“The sheriff shall determine the criminal and background history of any
applicant by . . . conducting a national criminal history records check, by conducting a check through
[NICS] . . . and by conducting a criminal history check through the Administrative Office of the
Courts.”). While some might argue that the added check of state level records is an additional
safeguard, in practice, it is simply negligible if North Carolina responsibly reports criminal infractions
to the FBI. Since state law disqualifiers mirror federal law disqualifiers, the federal system covers any
legal disqualifiers, making the state-level check irrelevant. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
Unless, of course, the state-level check was being used to deny permits based off of “good cause”
founded on mere charges or accusations alone, further highlighting the dangers of such subjective
qualifiers. See infra notes 180–84 and accompanying text.
178. Pub. L. No. 141-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
179. HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
special-topics/nics/index.html [https://perma.cc/6934-UD7L].
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Furthermore, since implementation of the permit system varies by county,
there is no single method of operation. 180 “The law is not uniformly followed
. . . nor is it enforced at the same rate.” 181 County sheriffs also hold a large range
of discretion, retaining the ability to deny one their constitutional right without
substantial due process. 182 This excessive amount of discretion seems to place
North Carolinians’ constitutional rights in the hands of their county sheriff
based on a subjective system that is susceptible to abuse. 183 Such is the case in
Henderson County, where Sheriff Charles McDonald openly admits he will
sometimes deny a permit based off of criminal charges, despite the individual
never being “convicted in court.” 184
This inconsistent application of the permit system creates opportunities
for discrimination. “Even now, in many jurisdictions in which police
departments have wide discretion in issuing firearm permits, the effect is that
permits are rarely issued to poor or minority citizens.” 185 When considering the
racially charged past of gun control, especially in North Carolina, the potential
for discriminatory implementation of the permit system is a real threat.

180. Joel Burgess, More Than 95 Percent of Local Pistol Permit Requests Approved, CITIZEN TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2016, 8:50 PM), https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2016/02/07/permit-lawadding-more-gun-control/78755132/ [https://perma.cc/56J7-S832].
181. Id.
182. See id. (describing how Sheriff Charles McDonald will deny a permit based on an applicant’s
criminal charges despite the applicant never being “convicted in court”).
183. For an example of how such a system could be abused, we can look to New York, where the
licensing system became a bribery system. Kaja Whitehouse, Ex-Cop: NYPD Gun License Division Was
a Bribery Machine, N.Y. POST (Apr. 17, 2018, 8:31 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/04/17/ex-cop-nypdgun-license-division-was-a-bribery-machine/ [https://perma.cc/X3A9-ETNT] (describing how gun
licenses were exchanged for money, prostitutes, watches, sports memorabilia, and vacations). “New
York City requires residents to have a pistol permit to own a handgun legally, but the law is
administered so stringently that virtually no residents of New York City other than retired police
officers are able to get a permit.” Gary Kleck, Gun Control After Heller and McDonald: What Cannot
Be Done and What Ought To Be Done, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1383, 1385 (2012). Less than one percent
of New York City residents have obtained a license to allow them to possess a handgun. Id. at 1386.
184. See Burgess, supra note 180 and accompanying text.
185. Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 67, 67 (1991).
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Table 1 186

Black Permit
Applicants
White Permit
Applicants

Total Number
of Applications

Number of Permit
Approvals

Number of Permit
Rejections

37,340

28,552

8,788

65,900

60,381

5,519

Table 1 illustrates a breakdown of permit applications in Wake County by race
from January 1, 2015, to December 3, 2020, and their associated approval or
rejection rates.
In practice, the Wake County Sheriff’s Office rejected 8.37% of White
applicants, while rejecting 23.54% of Black applicants. This amounts to Black
applicants experiencing a rejection rate of approximately three times the rate of
White applicants. Given Wake County’s similar racial composition to that of
North Carolina as a whole, 187 Wake County potentially represents statewide
trends. But while this data is certainly striking, the conclusions from it are
limited. Without further research into the reasons for permit denials broken
down by race, as well as data from all counties in North Carolina, definitive
conclusions regarding racial biases present in the modern permit system are
speculative. However, at a minimum, this data demonstrates the urgency for
further investigation into this issue.
A more recent example of the wanton implementation of the North
Carolina permit system is Wake County Sherriff Baker (seemingly
independently) announcing that the sheriff’s office would no longer be
accepting applications due to backlog. 188 After several lawsuits were filed,
Sherriff Baker ultimately reopened the application process, though more recent
lawsuits have been filed over the significant delay in approving permits. 189 In

186. Although Wake County maintains this information and it is considered public record, the
data is not accessible online. In December 2020, I submitted a North Carolina Public Records Request
asking for the data on permit rejections within Wake County. Wake County then provided this
information to me. The data is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
187. Compare Quick Facts: Wake County, North Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/wakecountynorthcarolina/RHI225219#RHI225219
[https://perma.cc/ZWD5-BFHB], with Quick Facts: North Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/NC [https://perma.cc/Z3DH-QP2Y].
188. Wake County Receiving ‘Unprecedented’ Number of Requests for Gun Permits,
WRAL, https://www.wral.com/coronavirus/group-files-third-lawsuit-against-wake-sheriff-over-gunpermits/19220600/ [https://perma.cc/36KL-GYLN (staff-uploaded archive)] (Aug. 5, 2020, 8:41 AM).
189. See id.
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Wake County, permit approvals can take as long as five weeks. 190 By
comparison, turnaround times for permits in Nash and Johnston Counties are
“just a few days.” 191
Mental health release forms compound this delay since permit applications
are not considered complete until the release forms are signed during an
appointment with the sheriff’s office. 192 In Wake County, an applicant is left in
limbo after completing the online portion of the permit application because they
receive only a message that the sheriff’s office will reach out to them to set up
an appointment. While not the same application process, a concealed carry
application appointment availability can be a useful gauge of backlog, as these
appointments are handled by the same department within the sheriff’s office.
As of September 24, 2020, concealed carry application appointments were “fully
booked” through January 2021. 193 Theoretically, one could submit the online
application and spend months waiting for an appointment to sign the medical
release forms and only then, would the fourteen-day statutory time limit start.
One might be thankful just to start the clock on the time limit, but some sheriffs
have little regard for state law. For example, Wake County Sheriff Baker readily
admits he is not complying with the fourteen-day time limitation because of
increased numbers of applications. 194 Despite violating state law, Sheriff Baker
maintains he has not violated anyone’s Second Amendment rights. 195 This
exemplifies the problem: North Carolinians should not be stuck with their
Second Amendment rights in limbo because of archaic, inefficient, and costly
gun-control schemes. 196 Nor should the ability to exercise one’s Second
Amendment rights depend on one’s county of residence.
190. Id.
191. Id. This difference in processing time very well may be a function of population differences.
Even still, it exposes further flaws of the permit system that could be alleviated by simply following
existing federal gun control. A citizen in Wake County should be able to enjoy their Second
Amendment rights just as expeditiously as another citizen in Nash or Johnston County.
192. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
193. A.P. Dillon, Protest of Wake Sheriff over Continued Pistol Permit Delays Is Canceled, N. ST. J.
(Sept. 24, 2020), http://nsjonline.com/article/2020/09/protest-wake-sheriff-continued-pistol-permitdelays-canceled/ [https://perma.cc/R6FR-WSPE].
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. In the course of writing this Comment, I applied for a pistol permit through the North
Carolina permit system. On September 25, 2020, I submitted my application packet online to the Wake
County Sherriff’s Office. On October 27, 2020—thirty days later—my application was approved, and
I was notified that I must call to make an appointment to show identification and sign the mental health
waiver form to receive my pistol permit. When calling the Wake County Sherriff’s Office on multiple
occasions, an automated message played notifying me that the office was busy with other formalities.
At the end of the automated message the call automatically disconnected with no option to remain on
hold. As of December 2020, I have not yet been able to reach the Wake County Sheriff’s Office to
schedule an appointment, and I have not yet received my permit. However, my situation is not unique.
Ashad Hajela, Wake County Sheriff Cuts Wait Time for Pistol Permits After Gun Rights Group Sued, NEWS
& OBSERVER, https://www.newsobserver.com/article247020792.html [https://perma.cc/9SRH-
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While the goal of crime prevention is certainly compelling, the permit
statute achieves nothing that federal law does not already cover—other than
adding inconveniences and substantial burdens to the citizens of North Carolina
who seek to exercise their Second Amendment rights. Furthermore, sheriff’s
offices are limited in their hours of operation, making it exceedingly difficult
and burdensome for working citizens to find the time to stop in on two separate
occasions in order to receive a permit. 197 In addition, citizens may even have to
take unpaid time off from work in order to make multiple trips to accommodate
the limited hours of operation. 198
Moreover, the scope of the permitting system seems overly broad. For
example, even if a grandfather wanted to gift his heirloom pistol to his
grandson, his grandson would have to jump through the burdensome and
unnecessary hoops of acquiring a pistol permit. 199
Overall, the pistol purchase permit scheme falls short of satisfying strict
scrutiny when challenged under the Second Amendment. This is mostly due to
the scheme’s redundancy with existing federal gun control laws. When viewed
in light of existing laws, the critical flaws of the permitting scheme are apparent:
(1) an inability to handle the volume of applications during periods of high
demand; and (2) the lack of any significant, measurable advantage to accompany
its increased burdens. 200 If federal law can achieve the same result with far less
burden, without placing citizens in lengthy periods of backlog, and without the
potential for racial biases to influence the process, the North Carolina permit
system can hardly be said to be narrowly tailored. 201 Sheriff Baker himself
R2WF (staff-uploaded dark archive)] (explaining that some applicants have waited up to “70 days” for
the Wake County Sheriff’s Office to process their applications).
197. For example, the Wake County Sherriff’s Office is open on Monday through Friday from
8:30 AM to 5:00 PM. Stephen R Walson, Pistol Purchase Permits, WAKEGOV (Oct. 28, 2020),
http://www.wakegov.com/sheriff/divisions/Pages/pistolpermits.aspx [https://perma.cc/VJ79-9ABM].
198. As one can imagine, this burden is amplified for poorer applicants since every hour lost means
missed wages. In addition, this disproportionately burdens people of color, who more often rely on
public transportation in getting to and from work. See Monica Anderson, Who Relies on Public Transit
in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/07/whorelies-on-public-transit-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/N5CQ-25CQ].
199. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-402 to 14-409 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the
2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.), with 18 U.S.C. § 922 (demonstrating that, unlike the North
Carolina permit system, under federal law, individuals can accept gifted firearms without a permit).
200. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down a law banning
possession of handguns and other firearms outside of the home because Illinois failed to justify having
more restrictive laws than any other state).
201. Looking back to the First Amendment, we can also see that the Supreme Court has been
relatively hostile to content-based restrictions. For example, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218
(2015), the Court struck down a content-based restriction on signs for failing to satisfy strict scrutiny,
reasoning that “[t]he Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is
necessary to beautify the Town while at the same time allowing unlimited numbers of other types of
signs that create the same problem.” Id. at 2231. Applying similar reasoning to the North Carolina
permit system, it is arguable that rifles and shotguns both pose the same danger to the community as
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admits the inadequacies of the permit system, saying “[y]ou can sue me all day
but those numbers tell you it’s going to be almost impossible to service that
number of applications with the processes in place, the background checks that
are required in the 14-day period.” 202 Ironically enough, public officials across
all of the United States have been steadily working with the NICS—despite
high volume—to ensure citizens have access to firearms to exercise their Second
Amendment rights. 203 In addition, less burdensome alternatives exist, such as
community outreach programs, educational brochures with gun purchases, gun
safety videos distributed by the sheriff’s department online, and so on.
Even if intermediate scrutiny were applied, the North Carolina permit
system would still fail to pass muster. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law
must serve an important governmental objective and the means employed must
be “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” 204 In addition,
the “justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in
response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations
. . . .” 205 Here, the government has an interest in crime prevention and public
safety. However, it is difficult to argue that those interests were at the forefront
of the permit system because it was enacted during the Jim Crow era alongside
explicit discriminatory laws. 206 And still today, we see strikingly different
permit approval rates between Black and White applicants. 207 Moreover, in
modern practice, the permit system fails to further public safety. The permit
system undermines the federal background check system by allowing for the
purchase and use of permits for up to five years in the future and obviating the
need for any further background checks during the five-year period. 208 If North
Carolina is concerned about public safety and crime prevention, it should prefer
the most recent information available on permit holders.
Even if First Amendment fee jurisprudence were applied, it is unlikely the
fees would survive intermediate scrutiny. Under the First Amendment, the fee
must cover actual administrative costs. 209 Here, the price of each permit
handguns yet are treated differently. It follows that North Carolina cannot claim that the strict limits
on the handguns are necessary. In other words, the permit system fails to satisfy strict scrutiny.
202. Dillon, supra note 193.
203. In fact, NICS is able to provide an answer within minutes for ninety-one percent of the time.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS, U.S. D.O.J., at iii (2014).
204. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins.,
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
205. Id.
206. See supra Section I.B.
207. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text.
208. See infra Section IV.D.
209. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1942) (striking down a statute requiring a paid
license to solicit literature, among other things, for failing to impose a regulatory measure calculated
to defray a legitimate expense of the state).
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remains five dollars, no matter how many, or how few, one purchases. 210 In
addition, Murdock strongly warns against the nature of such “flat license
tax[es],” 211 seemingly structured as if to grant the privilege of exercising a
right, 212 not defraying legitimate administrative costs. 213
For example, if an individual purchases five permits at once, they must
pay twenty-five dollars, but the background and mental health check only
happens once. Therefore, the number of checks and the administrative burden
would not increase by the number of permits purchased. The only arguable
difference would be the number of permits printed. If one permit and one
background and mental health check cost five dollars in administrative fees,
then five permits cannot each cost the same amount as the singular permit, as
the additional four permits do not require the same administrative burden.
Collectively, the permit system’s cost appears arbitrary as opposed to directly
tied to administrative burdens. As a result, the permitting system falls short of
satisfying intermediate scrutiny.
B.

The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Is Unconstitutional Under
the Second Amendment Using the Kavanaugh Test

The North Carolina permit system also falls short of constitutionality
under the Kavanaugh test. Under the Kavanaugh test, courts look to text,
history, and tradition to see if a law implicating the Second Amendment is
constitutional. 214 In other words, “[t]he scope of the right is thus determined by
‘historical justifications’ . . . [and] tradition.” 215 As previously discussed, the
permitting system found in North Carolina was not common historically nor is
it common today. 216 Furthermore, the concept of permit schemes originated in
210. N.C. DEP’T OF JUST., NORTH CAROLINA FIREARM LAWS 10 (2014), https://ncdoj.gov/
ncja/download/102/firearms/17352/north-carolina-firearms-laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/594M-K5EE]
(“There is no limit to the number or frequency of permit applications and the sheriff will charge $5.00
for each permit requested.”).
211. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 114 (“It is a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the
pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, it restrains
in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their
exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.”).
212. See id. at 114 (“[A] person cannot be compelled ‘to purchase, through a license fee or a license
tax, the privilege freely granted by the constitution.’” quoting Blue Island v. Kozul, 41 N.E.2d 515, 519
(Ill. 1942))).
213. See id. at 115 (“This tax is not a charge for the enjoyment of a privilege or benefit bestowed
by the state. The privilege in question exists apart from state authority. It is guaranteed [to] the people
by the Federal Constitution.”).
214. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). While this is
a dissenting opinion, with Justice Kavanaugh now sitting on the Supreme Court, it is worthwhile to
spend a portion of this Comment analyzing his test given the possibility that it could be adopted as the
standard were he able to convince other Justices to side with him.
215. Id.
216. See Kopel, Background Checks, supra note 82, at 360–61.
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the eighteenth century as a way to curtail gun ownership among freed slaves. 217
The only permit schemes active today are remnants from the Jim Crow era
when a small collection of states, North Carolina included, enacted permit
schemes governing handguns following in the footsteps of New York’s Sullivan
Act. 218 Seemingly, the only tradition present in these permit schemes is the
tradition of racially charged, discriminatory laws in the United States. 219
Indeed, there is a common understanding that these types of permit schemes
were never meant to apply to anyone other than minorities and, given their lack
of universal application, these permit schemes would not qualify as any sort of
tradition contemplated by the Kavanaugh test. 220 In addition to lacking
tradition, the North Carolina permit system is also devoid of any valid historical
justifications given its underlying racial motivations. 221 Therefore, the North
Carolina permit system is unconstitutional under the Kavanaugh test.
C.

The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 222 the Supreme Court held
that poll taxes are unconstitutional. 223 In that case, the Virginia Board of
Elections instated a $1.50 tax as a condition to obtaining a ballot. 224 The Court
struck down the measure, reasoning that the right to vote has no relation to
wealth nor to paying or not paying a fee, holding that “[w]ealth, like race, creed,
or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the
electoral process.” 225 In addition, “[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or
property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.” 226 Thus, “[t]o
introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications is
to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.” 227
Just as voting is a fundamental right, so too is the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms. Therefore, applying the principles outlined in
Harper, an individual’s right to keep and bear arms under the Second
Amendment cannot be subject to a fee imposed as a condition for exercise of
217. Id. at 337–38.
218. See supra Section I.B.
219. See generally Tahmassebi, supra note 185 (describing the historical connection between racism
and gun control policies).
220. See supra Section IV.B.
221. Id.
222. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
223. See id. at 666 (“We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard.”).
224. Id. at 668.
225. Id.
226. Id. (internal citation omitted).
227. Id.
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that right. The right to keep and bear arms, like the right to vote, has “no
relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying a fee.” 228 Some might argue that
the Second Amendment is related to wealth since one must purchase a gun to
exercise the right. However, that argument fails to consider that the permit
system also regulates gifted firearms or firearms transferred from one person to
another. Others might argue a five-dollar fee required to obtain a pistol permit
is insignificant considering the cost of handguns, but Harper makes clear that
“degree of discrimination” (here, the cost) is irrelevant. 229 Still, some may
contend that since individuals can obtain alternative arms without an associated
fee, equal protection under the law is not violated. This contention, however,
flies in the face of Heller. Heller indicated that handguns are the most popular
and widely used arms for self-defense in the United States and that the
existence of alternatives does not justify infringement. 230 Viewed under the
Equal Protection framework, pistol permit fees under the North Carolina
permit system discriminate against those with less means and severely inhibit
them from accessing the most popular means of self-defense, allowing for only
partial enjoyment of Second Amendment rights. Furthermore, poll taxes share
a common history with gun control—a focus on disenfranchising Black
Americans of fundamental rights as citizens. 231 The two rights have even
intertwined at points. In the South in the 1950s and 1960s, Black American gun
ownership was crucial for providing physical protection to enable voter
registration efforts. 232 In conclusion, pistol purchase permit fees under the
permit system are directly comparable to a poll tax and are therefore
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
D.

Redundancy and Potential Flaws of the North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit
System

As previously discussed, there is significant overlap between the North
Carolina permit system and federal law, making the permit system largely
redundant. 233 Moreover, the permit system has a major flaw. North Carolina

228. Id. at 666.
229. See id. at 668 (“To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications
is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant.”).
230. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) (“It is of no answer to say, as
petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns as long as the possession of other
firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed . . . [w]hatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”).
231. See supra Section I.B.
232. Cottrol, supra note 95, at 850.
233. See supra Section IV.D.
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pistol permits are valid for five years. 234 During the period for which a permit
is valid, no additional background checks are conducted. Therefore, one could
apply for five permits and buy one pistol each year for five years without ever
having another background check done. This is because under federal law, when
a buyer has possession of a pistol purchase permit, federally licensed firearm
dealers do not conduct an NICS background check. 235 As a result, there is a real
possibility that “people who have become prohibited from possessing firearms
may continue to hold state permits to purchase or permit firearms,” and may
continue holding the permit without renewing their background check, “if the
state fails to remove these permits in a timely fashion.” 236 This potentially
dangerous loophole is yet another reason that the redundant and
unconstitutional permit system should be repealed. Standardizing the process
for gun purchases across the board by having federally licensed firearm dealers
comply with federal law removes the weak point. And while some have concerns
regarding mental health reporting, part of the repeal could include a mandate
for reporting prohibited persons to NICS to make sure that no unauthorized
persons are able to purchase firearms.
E.

The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Is Ineffective

Currently, Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska and New York City have similar
systems to North Carolina, where only handguns require a permit to
purchase. 237 The following states require no permit to buy a handgun: Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. 238 The following chart represents a collection of the violent crime
rates in 2014 for the aforementioned states:
234. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-403 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. Sess. of
the Gen. Assemb.).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(3); 27 C.F.R. § 478.102(d) (2019).
236. Background Check Procedures: State by State, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/
gun-laws/state-law/50-state-summaries/background-check-procedures-state-by-state/
[https://perma.cc/9RHJ-FJN3].
237. See Licensing, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/gunowner-responsibilities/licensing/ [https://perma.cc/D8W3-XBS8] (explaining that only Iowa,
Maryland, Nebraska, North Carolina, New York City require permits, which expire after a specified
period, for the purchase of handguns, but not any other types of firearms). Note that, due to the focus
of this study, this statement excludes states in which a permit is required to purchase any type of
firearm.
238. The
Easiest States
To Buy
a
Gun,
HUFFPOST
(May 13, 2016),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-easiest-states-to-buy-a-gun_n_5735cfa8e4b08f96c182dc38
[https://perma.cc/99TK-WJSV]. Other states not listed implement a permit scheme for both long arms
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Table 2
State

Require
Handgun
Permit

Do Not
Require
Handgun
Permit

Iowa
Maryland
Michigan
Nebraska
New York 242
North Carolina
Alabama 243
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
Florida 244
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana

Violent Crime Rate
2018 (Rate per
100,000) 239
250.1
468.7
449.4
284.8
350.5
377.6
519.6
885.0
543.6
447.4
397.2
423.6
384.9
326.6
227.1
382.3

Percentage of
Murders with
Handguns 2018 240
25 241
73.4
30.02
51.16
46.52
48.23
N/A
14.89
30.28
47.95
47.82
29.17
N/A
72.18
43.75
36.66

(rifles and shotguns) and pistols. Id. While outside the scope of this Comment, it is unlikely such
permitting systems are constitutional under strict scrutiny and have thus been excluded.
239. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Table 4: Crime in the United States
by Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2017–2018, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION: UNIF. CRIME
REPORTING (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/
tables/table-4 [https://perma.cc/XYR6-9TMX].
240. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Table 20: Crime in the United
States, Murder by State, Types of Weapons, 2018, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION: UNIF. CRIME
REPORTING (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/
tables/table-20 [https://perma.cc/3YTS-LAU3] [hereinafter FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Murder by State].
241. Data from 2017 was used because the FBI received only a partial report in 2018. Id.
242. Since direct data for New York City is not available, data for the entirety of New York
is used for comparison. Theoretically, this should improve the rates since typically large
population centers have higher rates of violent crime. 2017 National Crime Victims’ Rights Week
Resource Guide: Urban and Rural Victimization, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. (2017),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ncvrw/2017/images/en_artwork/Fact_Sheets/2017NCVRW_Urb
anRural_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UTU-J5EJ].
243. Alabama was excluded from the “Percentage of Murders with Handguns 2018” list as the FBI
only received a partial homicide report of two murders. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Murder by
State, supra note 240.
244. Florida did not report murder weapon statistics to the FBI and therefore was excluded from
the “Percentage of Murders with Handguns 2018” calculation. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Murder by State, supra note 240.
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Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

439.0
211.9
537.5
112.1
234.4
502.1
374.1
541.1
173.2
856.6
280.6
279.9
466.1
285.5
306.0
219.1
488.3
404.7
623.7
410.9
233.1
172.0
200.0
311.5
289.9
295.4
212.2

42.73
47.26
44.72
26.09
69.72
42.34
26.47
22.89
28.57
28.47
50.0
33.70
47.03
37.04
58.96
6.25
48.7
38.46
49.40
40.12
28.81
30.0
36.06
32.76
36.84
37.64
50.0

Table 2 shows a breakdown of each state based on its overall violent crime rates
and percentages of murders committed with handguns.
From Table 2, we can calculate the average crime rates and average
percentage of murders committed with handguns in states with permit schemes
for handguns and from states without permit schemes for handguns:
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Table 3
Average Violent Crime
Rate (Rate per
100,000)
States with Handgun
Purchase Permits
Required
States Without
Handgun Purchase
Permit Requirement

Average Percentage of
Murders Committed
with Handguns

363.52

45.72

378.33

38.96

Table 3 shows the average violent crime rate as well as the average percentage
of murders committed with handguns.
As Table 3 demonstrates, states without any handgun permit schemes have
almost 7% fewer murders committed with handguns compared to those states
that have handgun permit schemes. 245 Furthermore, the average violent crime
rate of states that have permit schemes is only a marginal 4.07% decrease over
those states without the permit schemes. These statistics suggest that
mandating handgun permits to reduce murders and violent crimes is ineffective.
In addition, a recent Bureau of Justice Statistics study revealed that about 21%
of all state and federal prisoners reported that they had possessed or carried a
firearm when they committed the offense for which they were serving time in
prison. 246 Fewer than 2% of those who possessed a firearm had obtained said
firearm through a retail source. 247 Of those who specifically used a firearm in a
crime, only 1.3% reported obtaining the gun from a retail source. 248 And while
many express concerns for “gun show loopholes,” a mere 0.8% of those who
possessed a firearm obtained it at a gun show, whether through private sale or
through a dealer. 249
Overwhelmingly, 56% of those who possessed a firearm had either stolen it,
found it on the scene of a crime, or obtained it from the “underground market. 250
245. Admittedly, more research into this area would be beneficial, as different states have different
socioeconomic factors that could contribute to the results. Furthermore, information about the status
of the gun would be useful, such as stolen or legally acquired.
246. MARIEL ALPER & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
SOURCE AND USE OF FIREARMS INVOLVED IN CRIMES: SURVEY OF PRISON INMATES, 2016, at 1–
2 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/suficspi16.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2NB-QSXL].
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. The “underground market” is a term used to refer to illegal sources of firearms such as
markets for stolen goods, middlemen for stolen goods, criminals or criminal enterprises, or those
involved in the illegal drug trade. Id.
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Thus, the focus of state legislatures should be on reforming existing gun-control
laws, which are being subverted with stolen guns and black markets, rather than
enacting more hoops for law-abiding citizens to jump through.
Thus, the permit schemes do not appear to achieve their desired goal of
reducing handgun violence as supported by (1) the average percent of murders
committed with handguns, and (2) the statistics showing that overwhelmingly
crime is committed with illegally acquired guns. When analyzing the
combination of the ineffectiveness of the permit schemes with the fact that the
permits are mostly redundant with existing federal gun control law, it becomes
apparent that there is no reason to maintain pistol permit statutes on the books.
North Carolina should eliminate its permit scheme and align itself with the
majority of states by simply complying with existing federal gun-control laws.
Social science on gun violence lends further support for repealing the
North Carolina permit system. North Carolina claims to have a vested interest
in reducing gun violence, 251 however, focusing on the permitting system and
gun purchases largely overlooks the leading causes of systemic gun violence. A
recent study revealed that “the rich–poor gap, level of citizens’ trust in
institutions, economic opportunity, and public welfare spending were all
directly related to firearm homicide rates.” 252 If North Carolina is concerned
about gun violence, the tax dollars wasted on an inefficient permit system could
be better served in directing community outreach programs and social services
to mitigate gun violence in at-risk communities. 253 That same logic extends to
concerns about gun-related suicides, which have been linked to low income and
increased unemployment rather than firearm prevalence. 254
CONCLUSION
North Carolina remains in the nineteenth century with an antiquated and
largely ineffective permit system for the purchase of handguns. The North
Carolina permit system has direct ties to the Jim Crow era and, like similar
251. See Ford Porter, Governor Cooper Signs Gun Safety Executive Directive, N.C. GOVERNOR ROY
COOPER (Aug. 12, 2019), https://governor.nc.gov/news/governor-cooper-signs-gun-safety-executivedirective [https://perma.cc/2YKF-URFX] (“Wishing, praying, and sending condolences alone just
aren’t enough to prevent [gun violence]. We have to take action.”).
252. Daniel Kim, Social Determinants of Health in Relation to Firearm-Related Homicides in the United
States: A Nationwide Multilevel Cross-Sectional Study, PLOS MED. 2 (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002978&type=printable
[https://perma.cc/9G4E-MYDC].
253. For example, New Orleans implemented social and community services focusing on family,
school, job training, reentry, and community and economic development and saw a 21.9% reduction in
homicide from 2011 to 2014. ANDREW GUTHRIE FURGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING 42
(2017). In addition, the city saw a 55% reduction in group or gang-involved murders. Id.
254. Caillin Langmann, Effect of Firearms Legislation on Suicide and Homicide in Canada from 1981 to
2016, PLOS ONE 15 (June 18, 2020), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0234457 [https://perma.cc/B858-ZH32 ].
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permit schemes passed at the time, is rooted in a time of deep institutional
racism. 255 While Heller and McDonald provide some insight as to the evaluation
of laws implicating the Second Amendment, lower courts have incorrectly
diluted the principles. 256 However, even under these watered-down principles,
the North Carolina permit system must be analyzed under strict scrutiny due
to: (1) its direct impact on the core of the Second Amendment, (2) the burden
it places on the possession of a handgun in the home, and (3) its similarities to
First Amendment content-based restrictions. 257 Under strict scrutiny, the
permitting system fails because it is not narrowly tailored, and it does not
achieve the government’s goal in increasing public safety. Even under the
Kavanaugh test, the North Carolina permit system fails to pass muster, as it
lacks support in tradition and history. 258 Finally, the permit system is
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment when compared to a poll
tax. 259
North Carolina should repeal its unconstitutional permit system and
simply treat handguns and long guns the same way. Repealing the permit
system will simplify the administrative burden on the government, as well as
the process for citizens seeking to purchase handguns. Federally licensed
firearm dealers are already equipped to run NICS background checks, which
reduces the danger of errors when transitioning from the North Carolina permit
system to the federal requirements for pistol permits.
Constitutional issues aside, evidence shows that the permit system is
largely redundant with existing federal gun-control regulations. 260 Some even
postulate that state permit schemes pose a greater danger than the federal
system given the ability for permit holders to go for years without a background
check. 261 Additionally, statistical evidence shows that handgun permit schemes
are largely ineffective at achieving any governmental interests. 262 Other
statistical analysis shows that permit denials disproportionately fall on Black
applicants, who experience denials at roughly three times the rate of White
applicants. 263
The North Carolina legislature must act quickly in repealing the permit
system to fully restore the rights of its citizens, who have been burdened by the
pistol permit system for far too long. In doing so, North Carolina can attempt

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See supra Section I.B.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.C.
See supra Section IV.D.
See supra Section IV.D.
See supra Section IV.E.
See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text.
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to right the wrongs of its racially charged gun control 264 and embark on a new,
Second-Amendment-friendly journey.
NICHOLAS GALLO **

264. See supra Section I.B.
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